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We study counterfeiting of currency in a search-theoretic model of monetary 
exchange. In contrast to Nosal and Wallace (2007), we establish that counter-
feiting does not pose a threat to the existence of a monetary equilibrium; i.e., a 
monetary equilibrium exists irrespective of the cost of producing counterfeits, or 
the ease with which genuine money can be authenticated. However, the possi-
bility to counterfeit  at money can affect its value, velocity, output and welfare, 
even if no counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium. We provide two extensions of the 
model under which the threat of counterfeiting can materialize: counterfeits can 
circulate across periods, and sellers set terms of trades in some matches. Poli-
cies that make the currency more costly to counterfeit or easier to recognize raise 
the value of money and society’s welfare, but the latter policy does not always 
decrease counterfeiting.
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Recent advances in technology, like digital printers and higher quality scanners, have greatly reduced
the cost to produce counterfeits, posing serious challenges to currencies all over the world.1 Despite
the extent of counterfeiting being small in the U.S. ￿the value of counterfeit currency in 2005
was about 1 dollar for every $12,400 in circulation ￿the U.S. government have responded to this
threat by redesigning notes, and by enhancing the public￿ s ability to verify the authenticity of
currency through educational programs.2 To assess the e⁄ectiveness of various measures to deter
counterfeiting, one needs to understand the exact nature of the threat that counterfeiting poses on
the economic activity. Does the possibility of counterfeiting threaten the very existence of the ￿at
money system? Under which conditions does the threat of counterfeiting materialize? And, is it
necessary to continue e⁄orts regarding the deterrence and suppression of counterfeiting even when
counterfeiting seems insigni￿cant?
To answer these questions, one needs a model of monetary exchange, where the societal bene￿ts
of ￿at money are explicitly spelled out, and where genuine money is not perfectly recognizable and
can be counterfeited at some cost.3 This is precisely the approach of Nosal and Wallace (2007) ￿
NW hereafter ￿who study counterfeiting using the o⁄-the-shelves monetary model of Shi (1995)
and Trejos and Wright (1995). They derive two main implications: Counterfeiting of currency
1According to ￿The use and counterfeiting of United States currency abroad,￿Part 3, Section 6.6, the cost to
produce reasonably deceptive counterfeits could be as low as $300. The digital counterfeited notes as a fraction of all
passed notes increased from 0.5% in 1995 to 52% in 2005.
2In 2005, out of the $760 billion of U.S. banknotes in circulation $61 million of counterfeit currency was passed on
to the public. See ￿The use and counterfeiting of United States currency abroad,￿Part 3, page 47. Also, according
to the estimate by Judson and Porter (2003) counterfeit U.S. currency that has been passed into circulation is about
one note in ten thousands of currency in circulation. Two recent programs to improve the design of the U.S. currency
are the New Currency Design introduced in 1996 and the Series 2004 New Color of Money introduced in 2003. Both
programs were preceded by educational campaigns.
3Surprisingly, very little work has been devoted to this topic. Kultti (1996) and Green and Weber (1996) are
the ￿rst papers to study counterfeiting of currency in a random-matching model with exogenous prices. Williamson
(2002) investigates the counterfeiting of banknotes in a random-matching model with indivisible money but divisible
output. Nosal and Wallace (2007) introduce lotteries as a proxy for divisible money and show that it allows buyers
to signal the quality of their money holdings. Cavalcanti and Nosal (2007) and Monnet (2005) adopt a mechanism
design approach and focus on pooling allocations. In addition, Monnet (2005) does not restrict money holdings to
lie in f0;1g. Quercioli and Smith (2007) study counterfeiting in a non-monetary model but they introduce multiple
denominations and a costly decision to verify currency. Papers that consider competing assets of which one is subject
to the counterfeiting problem and study the liquidity di⁄erentials or acceptability of assets include, for example,
Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2007), and Kim and Lee (2008).
1does not occur in equilibrium; The possibility of counterfeiting constitutes a threat to the existence
of a monetary equilibrium, but the allocation in a monetary equilibrium is independent of the
technology to produce counterfeits or policies intended to improve the recognizability of genuine
money.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, despite using a similar equilibrium concept, we
obtain insights that are in contrast to the main results in NW.4 We establish that counterfeiting
does not pose a threat to the existence of a monetary equilibrium. That is, the cost of producing
counterfeits and the recognizability of genuine money do not determine whether ￿at money has
value. The intuition is simple: since counterfeiting involves a ￿xed cost, it should not threaten
a currency which is almost valueless. However, in contrast with the view that the allocation is
independent of the possibility of counterfeiting as long as it is not realized, we ￿nd that the cost of
producing counterfeits and the recognizability of genuine money can a⁄ect the value of ￿at money,
its velocity, output and welfare, even though no counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium. Our ￿ndings
also imply a di⁄erent objective for anti-counterfeiting policies: it is not to prevent the monetary
equilibrium from breaking down as suggested in NW; it is to raise output and welfare by mitigating
the threat of counterfeiting on the value of money.
Second, the prediction of no counterfeiting in NW is not consistent with the observed counter-
feiting on major currencies. In 2005 in the U.S., $61 million of counterfeit currency was passed on
to the public, 3717 counterfeiters were arrested, and 611 counterfeiting plants were suppressed.5
As documented by Mihm (2007), counterfeiting was a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. during
the 19th century. Another objective of the paper is thus to reconcile the prediction of the model
with the observed counterfeiting, signi￿cant or not, in the real world. To do so, we provide two
extensions of the model under which the threat of counterfeiting can materialize. The ￿rst ex-
tension relaxes the assumption of full con￿scation in NW. We assume that the government has
limited power to withdraw counterfeits so that individuals who receive them have a chance to pass
them on to someone else in the future. We provide a simple condition under which a counterfeiting
4In short, NW omit some equilibria by implicitly assuming that in any equilibrium with no counterfeiting all
o⁄ers made by buyers, even out-of-equilibrium ones, should be attributed to genuine buyers. See Appendix D for a
more detailed comparison between our approach and the one in NW.
5These numbers are taken from ￿The use and counterfeiting of United States currency abroad,￿Part 3, page 47.
2equilibrium exists, and we show that this equilibrium is separating ￿in meetings where the quality
of money is not recognized, genuine buyers and counterfeiters make di⁄erent o⁄ers.6 Counterfeiting
is more likely to take place if the stock of genuine money is low, if the cost to produce counterfeits
is small, and if the ability of the government to con￿scate counterfeits is limited.
The second extension consists in assuming that sellers can set terms of trade in some matches.
Counterfeiting is shown to prevail even under full con￿scation. When the quality of money is not
recognized, no trade takes place if buyers make the o⁄er, while terms of trade are pooled if sellers
make the o⁄er. This implies that sellers accept counterfeits in the instances where they cannot
verify the authenticity of currency. The results also demonstrate the distortions that counterfeiting
generates on the economic activity: in some occasions, mutually bene￿cial trades cannot take place,
while in others trades occur but terms of trade are distorted by the private information problem.
By enhancing the public￿ s ability in authenticating currency the government can increase the value
of money and society￿ s welfare, but it may not always decrease the extent of counterfeiting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment. In Sections 3
and 4 we analyze a simple game where sellers are always uninformed and counterfeits are con￿scated
at the end of each period. In Section 5 we consider the case of heterogeneously informed sellers.
Counterfeits are allowed to circulate across periods in Section 6 and sellers are endowed with some
bargaining power in Section 7.
2 The model
The environment is similar to the one in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). Time is indexed
by t 2 N. There is a large number of perfectly divisible and perishable goods and a unit measure of
agents who are specialized in the goods they produce and consume. Agents do not consume their





￿t [u(qt) ￿ ht]
#
;
6This implies that sellers accept counterfeits knowingly. Mihm (2007, p.221) provides examples where store
keepers in the 19th century U.S. would accept notes even when they would suspect those notes were counterfeits.
These episodes seem consistent with a separating equilibrium described here.
3where qt 2 R+ is consumption at time t, ht 2 R+ is the e⁄ort devoted to production, and ￿ =
(1 + r)￿1 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. We assume that u(q) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, u(0) = 0, and there exists q￿ > 0 such that
u0(q￿) = 1. Producing q units of output incurs disutility q:
Agents trade in bilateral matches. The pattern of specialization rules out double-coincidence-
of-wants matches but it allows single-coincidence matches where one agent wishes to consume the
good produced by his partner, but not vice versa. Agents cannot commit to future actions and the
trading histories are private information, which eliminates the possibility of credit arrangements.
Thus, trade must involve a tangible medium of exchange.
There are two types of money, genuine ￿at money and counterfeits. Both objects are indivisible,
perfectly durable and storable. For tractability, we assume money holdings lie in the set f0;1g. The
quantity of genuine money is m 2 (0;1). Agents who do not hold genuine money at the beginning
of a period decide whether or not to produce a counterfeit at a utility cost k > 0. As a result of
this decision, the measure of agents holding counterfeited notes is n 2 [0;1 ￿ m]. At the end of
each period, the government is able to take out of circulation a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1] of counterfeits.7
We assume that, though the government con￿scates counterfeits, it does not know the identity or
trading histories of agents, so the anonymity of agents is preserved. The measure of agents without
money is 1 ￿ m ￿ n. Notice the key di⁄erences between genuine and counterfeit monies: while the
former is in ￿xed supply, the latter is privately produced and it is subject to con￿scation by the
government.
Only meetings between agents holding money (genuine or counterfeit) and agents without money
occur. In particular, two money holders never meet.8 We assume a simple matching technology
where the probability for a buyer to be matched with a seller is equal to the measure of sellers in
the market, 1￿m￿n.9 The probability of a single coincidence match for an agent without money
7We assume the absence of punishment for an individual caught with a counterfeit. This is consistent with the
situation in the US in the 18th and 19th century where prosecutions were rare. For a more accurate description of
counterfeiting nowadays, one would also need to take into account the usually severe punishments for those producing
or attempting to pass counterfeited notes.
8This rules out the possibility that genuine money is exchanged for a counterfeit note plus some output. See,
e.g., Aiygari, Wallace and Wright (1996) and Li (2002).
9We could adopt di⁄erent matching technologies without a⁄ecting the main results (see, e.g., Li and Rocheteau
2008). We could also add explicitly a probability of single coincidence as in NW.
4is m + n. Conditional on being matched, the producer meets a money holder with genuine money
with probability m=(n + m).
In a match, a producer is informed about the quality of the money of his partner with probability
￿, in which case there is complete information in the match. With the complementary probability
1￿￿ the producer is uninformed and there is one-sided incomplete information. After matches are
terminated, all agents learn the quality of their money holdings.
Terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined by a bargaining protocol where the buyer
is chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er with probability ￿; while with the complementary
probability 1 ￿ ￿ the seller is the one to make the o⁄er. We assume ￿ = 1 throughout except
Section 7 where we consider ￿ < 1. If the other agent in the match accepts the o⁄er, trade is
implemented. Agents can o⁄er lotteries to overcome the indivisibility of money, as in Berentsen,
Molico and Wright (2002). The ability to make two-dimensional o⁄ers permits buyers with genuine
money to potentially separate themselves from counterfeiters.10
3 A simple counterfeiting game
Our main insights on how the threat of counterfeiting a⁄ects the equilibrium can be presented in
a simple environment where sellers are always uninformed (￿ = 0), counterfeits cannot circulate
across periods (￿ = 1) and only buyers make o⁄ers (￿ = 1). The ￿rst assumption allows us to focus
on the determination of terms of trade in uninformed matches, which is key for the incentives to
produce counterfeits. The second assumption (made in NW) implies that a counterfeit has no value
for someone who holds it after matches are dissolved. The third assumption (also used in NW)
allows us to focus on a bargaining game that has been used extensively in the literature. All these
assumptions will be relaxed in the subsequent sections.
We ￿rst analyze the one-period game starting at the beginning of a period, taking as given
the discounted continuation values of a money holder, ￿1, and an agent without money, ￿0. Later
10In search monetary models with indivisible money and complete information, the use of lotteries acts as an
imperfect proxy for divisibility of money: it allows agents to extract larger gains from trade, and it eliminates some
trade ine¢ ciencies (see, e.g., Berentsen and Rocheteau, 2002). In Appendix E we develop a model with divisible
money along the line of Lagos and Wright (2005), but with an overlapping generation structure, and we show that
our main insights are preserved. See also Rocheteau (2008).
5we will consider in￿nitely-lived agents that play the game repeatedly in a stationary economy.
Formally, the game is de￿ned as follows.
Players A measure m 2 (0;1) of buyers holding one unit of genuine money and a measure 1￿m
of agents without money.
Game tree First, each agent without money chooses to produce a counterfeit (￿ = c) or to
become a seller (￿ = s). Second, buyers and sellers are matched at random. Third, each matched
buyer makes an o⁄er (q;p) 2 R+ ￿ [0;1] where q is the output produced by the seller and p is the
probability that the buyer hands over his unit of money. Fourth, matched sellers accept or reject
the o⁄ers they receive.
Information structure The type of money held by an agent is private information. The o⁄ers
and acceptance decisions in a trade are private information to a match.
Payo⁄s The payo⁄ of an agent without money is represented by the following v.N-M utility
function,
U0(￿;qb;qs;d) = ￿kIf￿=cg + u(qb) ￿ qs + ￿0Ifd=0g + ￿1Ifd=1g;
where IA is an indicator function equal to one if A holds, ￿ 2 fc;sg is the agent￿ s decision to produce
a counterfeit, qb 2 R+ is his consumption, qs 2 R+ his production and d 2 f0;1g his money holdings
at the end of the game. (Recall that due to the single-coincidence matches, qbqs = 0.) Similarly,
the payo⁄ of an agent holding one unit of genuine money is represented by
U1(qb;d) = u(qb) + ￿0Ifd=0g + ￿1Ifd=1g:
A (pure) strategy for an agent without money is composed of the decision to produce a coun-
terfeit (￿ = c) or become a seller (￿ = s), which o⁄er (q;p) to make if ￿ = c, and which o⁄ers to
accept if ￿ = s. A strategy for a genuine buyer is an o⁄er (q;p). The seller￿ s belief that he faces a
genuine buyer following an o⁄er (q;p) is denoted ￿(q;p). We will assume that all sellers share the
same belief system.
6An equilibrium of this game is composed of a strategy for each player and a belief system ￿
that satisfy the following requirements:
Sequential rationality Given their belief ￿, sellers accept o⁄ers that yield a non-negative sur-
plus, i.e., ￿q + p￿(q;p)(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0.11 O⁄ers made by genuine buyers and counterfeiters are best
responses to sellers￿acceptance rule. (Since the no-trade o⁄er (0;0) is always accepted, we can,




b) = arg max
q;p￿1
[u(q) ￿ p(￿1 ￿ ￿0)] s.t. ￿ q + p￿(q;p)(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0; (1)
while the o⁄er of a counterfeiter solves
(qu
c;pu
c) = arg max
q;p￿1
u(q) s.t. ￿ q + p￿(q;p)(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0: (2)
The decision of an agent without money to produce a counterfeit or not is optimal given the measure













b(￿1 ￿ ￿0)] + n(￿qu
c): (3)
Consistency of beliefs with strategies For any o⁄er (q;p) made in equilibrium, ￿(q;p) is
derived from Bayes￿rule.
Because there is little discipline on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs this game admits a large
number (continuum) of sequential equilibria. In particular, any o⁄er that is acceptable by sellers
can be part of an equilibrium by using the threat that all other o⁄ers are attributed to counterfeiters.
The following lemma identi￿es that some strategies for agents without money are strictly dominated.
Lemma 1 The strategy of an agent without money that consists in producing a counterfeit (￿ = c)
and o⁄ering (q;p) such that ￿k+(1￿m)u(q) < 0 is strictly dominated by the strategy that consists
in becoming a seller (￿ = s) and rejecting all o⁄ers.
11Here we adopt the tie-breaking rule that a seller accepts any o⁄er that makes him indi⁄erent between accepting
or rejecting. This enables us to ￿nd a solution to the buyer￿ s problem.
7A natural requirement is that a seller assigns no probability to his opponent playing a strictly
dominated strategy. Together with Lemma 1 this leads to the following re￿nement on the belief
system.12
Re￿nement 1a (Elimination of strictly dominated strategies) ￿(q;p) = 1 for all (q;p)
such that ￿k + (1 ￿ m)u(q) < 0.
Re￿nement 1a simply says that, if a seller receives an o⁄er such that the expected utility of
consumption adjusted by the matching probability in an economy without counterfeiters is less
than the cost of producing a counterfeit then he should attribute it to a genuine buyer.
Lemma 2 The in￿mum for the surplus of a genuine buyer in a bilateral match for all belief systems
￿ that satisfy Re￿nement 1a is
max
q;p￿1
[u(q) ￿ p(￿1 ￿ ￿0)] (4)
s.t. ￿ q + p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0 (5)
￿k + (1 ￿ m)u(q) ￿ 0: (6)
Provided that k > 0 a genuine buyer can always secure a strictly positive surplus even though
the seller cannot recognize the quality of his money. Intuitively, a genuine buyer can always ask
for some low level of output which does not generate enough consumption value to cover the entry
cost of a counterfeiter and, hence, the o⁄er would be attributed with probability one to a buyer
holding genuine money. Moreover, the higher the production cost of a counterfeiter, the larger the
surplus that the genuine buyer can secure.13 We will see later that this is the insight that explains
the robustness of the monetary equilibrium.
In order to re￿ne the beliefs further, we follow NW and adopt a forward-induction argument,
in spirit of the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987).14
12Our game has a similar structure as the one used in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.438, Fig. 11.1) to motivate
the notion of strategic stability.
13This ￿nding is in sharp contrast with the outcome of the same bargaining game under pure adverse selection,
i.e., when the distribution of types is exogenous. In that case, the no-trade outcome is obtained under the Intuitive
Criterion.
14The game we are considering is not a signaling game with exogenous types as in Cho and Kreps (1987), i.e., the
types that are relevant in the bargaining game are chosen endogenously. The re￿nement we are using, however, is
8Re￿nement 1b (Forward induction) Consider an equilibrium where U1 and U0 are the ex-
pected payo⁄s of a genuine buyer and an agent without money, respectively, and n is the measure
of counterfeiters. The proposed equilibrium is disquali￿ed if there exists an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er
(q0;p0) such that:
￿k + (1 ￿ n ￿ m)u(q0) + ￿0 < U0 (7)
(1 ￿ n ￿ m)
￿
u(q0) ￿ p0(￿1 ￿ ￿0)
￿
+ ￿1 > U1 (8)
￿q0 + p0(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0: (9)
From (7) an agent without money would not choose to produce a counterfeit to make an o⁄er
(q0;p0) that reduces his payo⁄ compared to the proposed equilibrium, irrespective of how a seller
would interpret this o⁄er (even under the most favorable beliefs of sellers). It should be clear that
(7) is equivalent to q0 < q (where q is the output at the proposed equilibrium), i.e., a counterfeiter
would not propose to consume less than what he can obtain in equilibrium. From (8) the o⁄er
(q0;p0) would bene￿t a genuine buyer if it were to be accepted; from (9) it is acceptable provided
that ￿(q0;p0) = 1.15
Proposition 1 Under Re￿nement 1b, there is no equilibrium with n > 0. In any equilibrium with
n = 0 the o⁄er made by a genuine buyer solves (4)-(6).
There cannot be a pooling o⁄er with active trades under Re￿nement 1b (same as Proposition 1
in NW). If such a pooling o⁄er were made in equilibrium then a buyer with genuine money could
signal the quality of his currency by proposing an (out-of-equilibrium) o⁄er where he transfers
money with a smaller probability and he consumes less output.
Under the Cho-Kreps re￿nement the genuine buyer￿ s payo⁄ is exactly the solution to (4)-(6).
This suggests that the re￿nement we use does not confer an additional advantage to ￿at money
inspired by the same forward-induction logic as the one underlying the Intuitive Criterion. There are other re￿nements
for signaling games (e.g., the undefeated equilibrium from Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1993) but they
are not directly applicable to games with endogenous types. For a method to analyze a class of signaling games with
endogenous types, see In and Wright (2008). We apply this methodology in a di⁄erent version of our model with
divisible money and obtain similar insights. See Appendix E.
15Notice that Re￿nement 1b is consistent with Re￿nement 1a in the following sense. Consider a proposed equi-
librium where the surplus of the genuine buyer is less than the lower bound de￿ned in Lemma 2. This equilibrium
would have to be sustained by a belief system that violates Re￿nement 1a, and it could be dismissed by Re￿nement
1b.
9relative to Re￿nement 1a. Hence, we conjecture that if there is a monetary equilibrium under
our re￿nement, there should also be a monetary equilibrium under an alternative speci￿cation for
sellers￿beliefs provided that they comply with Re￿nement 1a.
According to (4)-(6) genuine buyers choose the o⁄er that maximizes their payo⁄and that deters
counterfeiting. The terms of trade in bilateral matches solve
qu

















Provided that k is su¢ ciently large, buyers make the same o⁄er as the one they would make in
an economy where counterfeiting is not even a possibility. However, if k is not too large so that
(6) binds then buyers lower the output they ask for so that to deter the entry in counterfeiting. A
belief system of sellers to sustain the o⁄er (qu
b;pu
b) as an equilibrium o⁄er is such that all o⁄ers that
satisfy ￿k+(1￿m)u(q) ￿ 0 are attributed to genuine buyers while all other o⁄ers are attributed to
an agent without money who chose to be a counterfeiter. As a consequence, all o⁄ers that violate
(6) are rejected by sellers.
In the equilibrium of the one-period game, all agents without money choose to be sellers.
Genuine buyers propose (qu
b;pu
b) solution to (10)-(12). Agents without money who would have
chosen to produce counterfeits would o⁄er the highest q consistent with ￿q + p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0 and
￿k+(1￿m)u(q) ￿ 0: Sellers accept all o⁄ers such that ￿q+p(￿1￿￿0) ￿ 0 and ￿k+(1￿m)u(q) ￿ 0:
4 The threat of counterfeiting in equilibrium
So far we have studied the game that takes place within a period taking as given the continuation
values ￿1 and ￿0. We now consider our model where the game repeats itself every period and the
time horizon is in￿nite. An agent￿ s strategy is restricted not to depend on his past private histories
since such histories are payo⁄-irrelevant. Moreover, we focus on stationary equilibria where ￿0 and
￿1 are constant across periods.
10From Proposition 1, n = 0 and ￿0 = 0. The value of a genuine buyer, ￿1, solves the following
￿ ow Bellman equation,
r￿1 = (1 ￿ m)[u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b]; (13)
where r = ￿￿1 ￿ 1 and qu
b solves (4)-(6).16 As is standard, (13) states that the ￿ ow return of
holding genuine money is the expected surplus from a match in case trade occurs.
A monetary equilibrium in this economy consists of hqu
b;pu
b;￿1i such that (qu
b;pu
b) solves (4)-(6)
and ￿1 > 0 solves (13).
Proposition 2 There exists a unique monetary equilibrium (under Re￿nement 1b) i⁄





According to Proposition 2, the possibility of counterfeiting does not constitute a threat to
the existence of a monetary equilibrium in the sense that the set of parameters that determine
whether ￿at money is valued does not include the cost to produce counterfeits.17 In particular, if
u0(0) = +1 then there always exist a monetary equilibrium even if ￿at money can be counterfeited
and sellers are unable to recognize the quality of the money held by buyers. This result relies
on a key characteristic of counterfeiting activities ￿a ￿xed entry cost. From Lemma 2, it is this
￿xed cost that secures a positive surplus for genuine buyers, taking ￿1 as given. Put it di⁄erently,
nobody would pay the cost to imitate an object which has almost no value, so that the existence
of a valued ￿at money is never threatened.
16Recall that ￿1 is the present value of an agent holding a unit of genuine money at the beginning of the next
period. Let V1 = (1 + r)￿1. Then, V1 satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
V1 = (1 ￿ m)[u(q
u
b ) + (1 ￿ p
u
b)￿V1] + m￿V1:
With probability 1￿m a genuine buyer meets a seller, then he consumes q
u
b and delivers money with probability p
u
b:




b to get (13).
17Our Proposition is in contrast with Proposition 2 in NW where a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
existence of a monetary equilibrium is k > (1 ￿ m)u(￿ q) where ￿ q is the equilibrium quantity in an economy where
counterfeiting is not a possibility. The di⁄erence between their result and ours can be traced back to their problem 1
(p.997) that determines terms of trade. They assume that the seller￿ s belief is independent of the o⁄er made by the
buyer and is equal to the fraction of genuine buyers in equilibrium. This belief system is even more restrictive than
the Cho-Kreps re￿nement, which explains why NW does not uncover all the equilibria. We provide a more detailed
discussion in Appendix D.
11The threat of counterfeiting, however, matters for the allocation and welfare. Let ￿￿
1 be the
unique positive solution to r￿1 = (1￿m)fu[q(￿1)] ￿ q(￿1)g where q(￿1) = min(q￿;￿1). Here ￿￿
1 is
the value of genuine money in an economy where there is no possibility to counterfeit currency.
Proposition 3 Suppose r < (1 ￿ m)[u0(0) ￿ 1]. Then, there is ￿ k = (1 ￿ m)u[min(q￿;￿￿
1)] such




dk > 0 and
dpu
b
dk > 0. As k ! 0 then qu
b ! 0 and ￿1 ! 0:
Even though no counterfeiting takes place in equilibrium, the mere possibility of counterfeiting
a⁄ects the equilibrium provided that the cost of producing counterfeits is not too large. This is
another example where an out-of-equilibrium threat a⁄ects the equilibrium outcome. Intuitively,
buyers never trade more than the quantity that would give incentives to agents without money
to produce counterfeits; i.e., the existence of a non-counterfeiting equilibrium can be a result of
the market discipline. Even so, our model legitimates policies that consist in making a currency
harder to counterfeit: by raising the cost to produce counterfeits the policy-makers can increase
the velocity of money, output and welfare. Notice that the monetary equilibrium disappears at
the limit when the cost to produce counterfeits is driven to zero. If the cost is above a certain
threshold, the possibility of counterfeiting cannot a⁄ect the economic activity so that the threat of
counterfeiting is inactive.
5 Heterogeneous information
We extend the model to allow sellers to receive informative signals about the authenticity of the
money held by buyers, i.e., ￿ 2 (0;1). The objectives are twofold. By introducing a proxy for the
recognizability of money we will be able to assess the e⁄ects of advertising campaigns that make
the public more able to verify the authenticity of currency. Secondly, we will show that under some
conditions the terms of trade can vary across matches depending on whether the quality of money
is recognized or not.
The signal received by the seller is common knowledge in the match. The de￿nition of equilib-
rium must be adapted so that the strategy of an agent without money speci￿es his acceptance rule
depending on the signal he receives. Similarly, the strategy of a buyer must specify an o⁄er as a





q;p [u(q) ￿ p￿1] s.t. ￿ q + p￿1 ￿ 0; (15)
if the buyer holds a genuine unit of money. If the buyer in the match holds a counterfeit then
qi
c = 0 and pi
c 2 [0;1].
Regarding the terms of trade in uninformed matches, we adopt a forward-induction argument
similar to Re￿nement 1b. Following the same logic as in Proposition 1, the equilibrium of the





q;p [u(q) ￿ p￿1] (16)
s.t. ￿ q + p￿1 ￿ 0 (17)
￿k + (1 ￿ m)(1 ￿ ￿)u(q) ￿ 0: (18)
A belief system that sustains (qu
b;pu
b) as an equilibrium o⁄er is ￿(q;p) = 1 if (18) holds, and
￿(q;p) = 0 otherwise. The novelty in (18) comes from the fact that an agent who chooses to
produce a counterfeit can obtain some output only when the quality of his money is not recognized,
with probability 1 ￿ ￿.
The value of genuine money in a non-counterfeiting equilibrium solves






+ (1 ￿ m)(1 ￿ ￿)[u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b]: (19)










b) solves (15) and (qu
b;pu
b) solves
(16)-(18), and ￿1 > 0 solves (19). There exists a unique monetary equilibrium under condition (14).
We establish the e⁄ects of the recognizability of money on the economic activity in the following
proposition .
Proposition 4 Suppose r < (1￿m)[u0(0) ￿ 1] holds. Then, there is ￿ k = (1￿m)(1￿￿)u[min(q￿;￿￿
1)]
such that:
1. For all k < ￿ k ,
dqu
b
d￿ > 0 and d￿1










13In equilibrium, sellers know that they meet genuine buyers with probability one. However,
provided that the cost to produce counterfeits is su¢ ciently low, agents trade lower quantities
and spend their money with a lower probability in matches where the authenticity of money is
not veri￿ed. The recognizability of money has real e⁄ects ￿ it matters for the distribution of
terms of trade, the value and velocity of money, output and welfare. Once again even though no
counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium, the possibility of counterfeiting (an out-of-equilibrium threat)
a⁄ects the economic activity. Also, in contrast to standard search equilibrium models, a distribution
of terms of trade emerges even though agents on both sides of the market are homogenous.
6 The materializing threat: Circulating counterfeits
The model with full con￿scation that we have considered so far predicts no counterfeiting in any
equilibrium (as in NW). One key assumption that prevents counterfeiting from emerging is that
counterfeit money cannot circulate across periods. To account for the extent of counterfeiting,
in this section we assume that the government has limited ability to take the counterfeits out of
circulation: only a fraction ￿ 2 (0;1) of the counterfeits are con￿scated at the end of each period.
We show that counterfeiting can occur in a monetary equilibrium, and study the e⁄ectiveness of
the policies against counterfeiting.18
As a consequence of the assumption ￿ 2 (0;1); agents at the beginning of each period can be
divided into three types: agents holding genuine money, agents holding counterfeits inherited from
the previous trades, and agents without money. Let ￿c denote the present value of an agent holding
a counterfeit at the beginning of the next period. We denote !1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿0 the value of genuine
money and !c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿c ￿ ￿0) the value of a counterfeit.
As in the previous sections, an equilibrium consists of a pro￿le of strategies (i.e., o⁄ers, ac-
ceptance rules and decision to produce counterfeits) and a belief system for sellers that satisfy
sequential rationality and consistency of beliefs with strategies. The determination of the terms
of trade in informed matches is given by (15) with ￿1 replaced by !1, if the buyer holds a unit of






q;p [u(q) ￿ p!c] s.t. ￿ q + p!c ￿ 0; (20)
if the buyer holds a counterfeit (irrespective of whether it has been produced or acquired in past
trades). In uninformed matches an agent holding a counterfeit makes an o⁄er that solves
(qu
c;pu
c) = arg max
q;p￿1
[u(q) ￿ p!c] s.t. ￿ q + pf￿(q;p)!1 + [1 ￿ ￿(q;p)]!cg ￿ 0: (21)
In this section we look for counterfeiting equilibria with n > 0 and !1 > !c, i.e., genuine money
is more valuable than counterfeits. We adopt the following forward-induction argument to re￿ne
sellers￿beliefs in uninformed matches.
Re￿nement 2 Consider a proposed equilibrium with n > 0 where the trade surpluses of a genuine
buyer and a counterfeiter in uninformed matches are Su
1 and Su
c , respectively. This equilibrium is
disquali￿ed if there is an out-of-equilibrium o⁄er (q0;p0) such that the following is true:
u(q0) ￿ p0!1 > Su
1; (22)
u(q0) ￿ p0!c < Su
c ; (23)
￿q0 + p0!1 ￿ 0: (24)
According to (22), the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er (q0;p0) would make a buyer with genuine money
strictly better o⁄ if it were accepted. According to (23), the o⁄er (q0;p0) would make a buyer with
a counterfeit strictly worse o⁄. That is, an agent without money would not choose to produce
a counterfeit to make such an o⁄er since in the proposed counterfeiting equilibrium he is just
indi⁄erent between being a seller or a counterfeiter. According to (24) the o⁄er is acceptable
provided that the seller believes it comes from a buyer with genuine money.
Lemma 3 The o⁄er made by a counterfeiter in an uninformed match solves
(qu
c;pu
c) = arg max
q;p2[0;1]
[u(q) ￿ p!c] s.t. ￿ q + p!c ￿ 0: (25)
The o⁄er made by a genuine buyer solves
(qu
b;pu
b) = arg max
q;p2[0;1]
[u(q) ￿ p!1] s.t. ￿ q + p!1 ￿ 0; (26)
u(q) ￿ p!c ￿ u(qu
c) ￿ pu
c!c: (27)
15There cannot be a pooling o⁄er with active trades under our forward-induction re￿nement.
If such a pooling o⁄er were made in equilibrium then a buyer with genuine money could signal
the quality of his currency by proposing an (out-of-equilibrium) o⁄er where he transfers money
with a lower probability and he consumes less output. The logic is similar to the one used to
dismiss pooling equilibria in Proposition 1. A belief system consistent with the o⁄ers in (25)-(27)
is such that sellers attribute all o⁄ers that violate (27) to buyers with counterfeits, and all other
out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers to buyers with genuine money.
The solution to the problem of the genuine buyer is characterized in the following lemma.




















If !c > 0 then the o⁄er is separating and the buyer with genuine money obtains less output
than the buyer with a counterfeit, but spends his money with a lower probability.
From the characterization of the terms of trade above it is immediate that ￿0 = 0. The ￿ ow
Bellman equation for the value of an agent holding a counterfeit is19







From Lemma 3, counterfeiters make their complete information o⁄er in all matches, i.e., qi
c = qu
c =
qc = min[q￿;!c] and pc = qc=!c. The last term on the right-hand side of (30) captures the fact












19Let Vc = (1 + r)￿c, then it solves the following Bellman equation








+ (m + n)(1 ￿ ￿)￿Vc:




c(1 ￿ ￿)￿Vc to get (30).
16Counterfeiting occurs in equilibrium if !c = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)k, which from (31) implies
1 ￿ m ￿ n =





The value of genuine money, ￿1 = !1, obeys











Given that ￿0 = 0, we de￿ne a monetary equilibrium as follows.













satis￿es: (i) the equations for the determination of the terms of trades, (15), (20), (25), (26)-(27);
(ii) the Bellman equations, (30) and (33); (iii) the entry condition in the counterfeiting sector,
(32); and (iv) the conditions for a monetary equilibrium, ￿1 > 0, and for genuine money to be
more valuable than counterfeits, ￿1 > (1 ￿ ￿)￿c.
The counterfeiting equilibrium has a recursive structure. Equation (32) determines n while,
given n, (33) generates ￿1.
Proposition 5 If
r0 < (1 ￿ m)[u0(0) ￿ 1]; (34)
where r0 =
1￿(1￿￿)￿
(1￿￿)￿ , then there is ￿ k > 0 such that for all k < ￿ k there exists a counterfeiting
equilibrium.
If u0(0) = +1 then there always exists a counterfeiting equilibrium provided that the cost of
counterfeiting is small. Counterfeiting can prevail in equilibrium, even though counterfeiters and
genuine buyers make di⁄erent o⁄ers; i.e., people accept counterfeits knowingly. Just like genuine
money, there is a chance that counterfeits can be passed on to someone else and traded for some
output in the future. From Proposition 5, counterfeiting is more likely to take place if the stock of
genuine money is low, if the cost to produce counterfeits is small, and if the ability of the government
to con￿scate counterfeits is limited.
We now study the e⁄ects of various policies on the extent of counterfeiting and the value of
money. Let n(m;k;￿;￿) and !1(m;k;￿;￿) denote the equilibrium measure of counterfeiters and
the equilibrium value of genuine money as functions of exogenous variables.
17Proposition 6 Assume (45) holds. Then: (i) @n
@m = ￿1 and @!1
@m = 0; (ii) @n
@k < 0 and @!1
@k > 0;
(iii) @n
@￿ = 0 and @!1
@￿ > 0; (iv) @n
@￿ < 0 and @!1
@￿ > 0.
The fraction of agents holding a unit of money (genuine or fake) is uniquely pinned down by the
free entry in the counterfeiting sector. Consequently, an increase in the supply of genuine money
has a complete crowding-out e⁄ect on counterfeits, leaving the value of genuine money unchanged.
By endowing a larger number of buyers with genuine money the monetary authority reduces the
available space to counterfeiters.
In terms of anti-counterfeiting policies, higher con￿scation rate of counterfeits reduces the extent
of counterfeiting, and raises the value of genuine money. An increase in the recognizability of genuine
money (￿) raises the value of genuine money since the surplus enjoyed by genuine buyers is greater
in informed matches than in uninformed matches. The improving recognizability, however, does not
a⁄ect counterfeiting activity because in a separating equilibrium the o⁄ers made by counterfeiters
depend on the production cost of counterfeits but not on the value of genuine money.
Society￿ s welfare is measured by the sum of all agents￿expected lifetime utility, i.e., W =
￿￿1 [(1 ￿ m ￿ n)￿0 + m￿1 + n￿c] ￿ ￿nk, where the last term comes from the fact that a fraction ￿
of the counterfeits are con￿scated and replaced in every period. Since ￿0 = 0 and ￿c = ￿k, we have
W = ￿￿1 (m!1 + n!c): (35)
The society￿ s welfare is equal to the aggregate real balances in the economy, which also includes
the real value of counterfeits.
Proposition 7 Suppose (45) holds. Then, dW=dm > 0 and dW=d￿ > 0.
An increase in the stock of genuine money raises welfare by substituting one-for-one counterfeits
by more valuable genuine money. An increase in the fraction of informed matches raises welfare by
making genuine money more valuable.
Whether a higher con￿scation rate ￿ can improve welfare depends on the stock of genuine money
in the economy. In Figure 1, we consider a numerical example where the stock of genuine money
is substantially low, m = 0:01; a situation that can be interpreted as a currency shortage.20 An
20The rest of the parametrization is u(q) = 2
p
q, ￿ = 0:5, r = 0:1 and k = 0:5. Welfare is measured relative to the
￿rst best level, which is 1=4.
18Figure 1: Con￿scation of counterfeits under a currency shortage
increase in the con￿scation rate deters counterfeiting and raises the value of genuine money, but it
lowers welfare. Although it is believed that counterfeiting does harm to the economy and should
be eliminated, our example suggests that the policy makers should let them circulate as long as the
government cannot control the supply of genuine money and there is a severe currency shortage.21
To conclude this section, we investigate the limiting case where the government has no en-
forcement power and cannot con￿scate counterfeits, i.e., we consider the limit of the equilibrium
as ￿ ! 0. The following proposition shows the existence of a counterfeiting equilibrium under an
extremely lax anti-counterfeiting policy.
Proposition 8 Consider the limit economy as ￿ ! 0. If
r < (1 ￿ m)[u0(0) ￿ 1];
then there is ￿ k > 0 such that for all k < ￿ k there exists a counterfeiting equilibrium, and it is such
that !1 = !c = ￿k:
Notice that the condition for the existence of a counterfeiting equilibrium here is identical to
the condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium in the previous sections (e.g., Proposition
2), with an additional requirement k < ￿ k: When the con￿scation rate tends to zero, counterfeits
21Mihm (2007) provides numerous quotes in support of the thesis that counterfeiting might have been a necessary
evil to overcome the currency shortage in the U.S. before the civil war. For instance, Burroughs, the ￿rst famous
counterfeiter in the U.S., in his memoirs (Cited in Mihm, 2007, p.41) quotes a friend saying: ￿ ￿ An undue scarcity
of cash now prevails [and] whoever contributes, really, to increase the quantity of cash, does not only himself, but
likewise the community, an essentiel bene￿t.￿￿ Daniel Mevis in his Pioneer Recollections (cited in Mihm, 2007, p.
159) wrote: ￿ ￿ Counterfeiting and issuing worthless ￿ bank notes￿... was not looked upon as a felony as it would be
today. Of course, it was taken for granted that it was a ￿ little crooked￿but the scarcity of real money, together with
the necessity of for a medium of exchange, made almost anything that looked like money answer the purpose.￿￿
19circulate as genuine money does. Furthermore, counterfeits and genuine money trade at the same
value which, given !c = ￿k; is determined by the entry cost in the counterfeiting sector.
7 The materializing threat: Pooling o⁄ers
The counterfeiting equilibria obtained in Section 6 have the feature that genuine buyers are able
to separate themselves from counterfeiters by making an o⁄er that the latter would not imitate.
As a consequence, sellers accept counterfeits knowingly. In this section we consider the model as
in Section 5 but assume ￿ < 1: We will show that if sellers are informed in some matches (￿ > 0) a
counterfeiting equilibrium can exist even if counterfeits cannot circulate across periods (￿ = 1).22
In this equilibrium sellers accept counterfeits in the instances where they cannot recognize the
authenticity of currency.
In informed matches buyers o⁄er (qi
b;pi
b) solution to (15) while sellers o⁄er (qi
s;pi
s) if the buyer
holds a genuine note, with
(qi
s;pi
s) = arg max
q;p￿1
[￿q + p(￿1 ￿ ￿0)] s.t. u(q) ￿ p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0. (36)







s)=!1. In uninformed matches, sellers
may o⁄er a menu of terms of trades as an attempt to screen buyers holding genuine money. We
impose that sellers cannot commit to terms of trade that are not ex-post individually rational.







p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ q
￿
s.t. u(q) ￿ p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0. (37)
Given that counterfeits have no value, sellers cannot credibly o⁄er to accept a counterfeit, and
hence they must o⁄er terms of trade that pool genuine buyers and counterfeiters. According to
(37) sellers make an o⁄er that maximizes the expected value of the currency they receive minus
the production cost, taking into account the acceptance rule of genuine buyers only. The solution












We focus on a monetary equilibrium with counterfeiting, i.e., n > 0. The following lemma
shows that no trade takes place in uninformed matches when buyers make the o⁄er.
22In Appendix C we show that counterfeiting cannot occur in any equilibrium if ￿ = 0.




Under the Intuitive Criterion (Re￿nement 1b) a genuine buyer can break out of a pooling
equilibrium by o⁄ering to consume less output and to transfer money with a lower probability. The
no-trade outcome is sustained by the sellers￿belief that any o⁄er with positive output comes from
a counterfeiter, i.e., ￿(q;p) = 0 whenever q > 0. Even though counterfeiters get zero consumption
when they make o⁄ers, agents may be willing to produce counterfeits because they can obtain some
surplus from the pooling o⁄ers made by sellers.
The value functions for agents in di⁄erent states obey the following ￿ ow Bellman equations

























r￿c = (1 ￿ m ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)u(qu
s) ￿ (￿c ￿ ￿0): (40)
According to (38), a genuine buyer can only obtain a positive surplus in an informed match when he
makes the o⁄er. According to (39), a seller enjoys a positive expected surplus whenever he makes
the o⁄er. From (40), a counterfeiter enjoys some consumption if the seller makes the o⁄er in an
uninformed match.23 Finally, assuming an interior solution, the measure of counterfeiters solves
￿c ￿ ￿0 = ￿k: (41)











is￿es: (i) the equations for the terms of trade, (15), (36), (37); (ii) the ￿ow Bellman equations
(38)-(40); (iii) the entry condition in the counterfeiting sector, (41); and (iv) the condition for a
monetary equilibrium, ￿1 > 0.
Society￿ s welfare, W, is measured as the sum of the surpluses across all matches minus the cost
23Let Vc = (1 + r)￿c; then it solves the following Bellman equation
Vc = (1 ￿ m ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[u(q
u
s) + ￿V0] + [1 ￿ (1 ￿ m ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]￿V0:
Since counterfeits are con￿scated at the end of a period, the continuation value is ￿V0 no matter the counterfeiter
trades or not from a match. Subtract ￿Vc from both sides to get (40).
21to produce counterfeits, i.e.,














+(m + n)(1 ￿ m ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[u(qu
s) ￿ qu
s] ￿ nk: (42)
Counterfeiting exerts various adverse e⁄ects on society￿ s welfare. No trade takes place in uninformed
matches when buyers make o⁄ers even though some buyers hold genuine money. The trade surplus
is lower in uninformed matches than in the informed matches since sellers make pooling o⁄ers.
There is also a direct cost because resources are used to produce counterfeits.
We study the equilibrium through numerical examples. Our benchmark parametrization is
u(q) = 2
p
q, r = 0:1, m = 0:3, ￿ = ￿ = 0:5 and k = 0:02. In Figure 2 we report how changes in
policy variables (k, ￿ and m) and market structure (￿) a⁄ect the measure of counterfeiters, the
value of genuine money, and welfare. In the last column of Figure 2, we express W as a fraction of
the welfare at the ￿rst best allocation.24
Policies that raise the cost of producing counterfeits and make genuine money more recognizable
have a positive e⁄ect on the value of genuine money and social welfare (see the ￿rst two rows in
Figure 2). Moreover, a higher k reduces n while the relationship between n and ￿ is non-monotonic.
If it is very di¢ cult to distinguish a unit of genuine money from a counterfeit then an improvement
in the recognizability of money can in fact promote counterfeiting. The reason is that genuine
money becomes more valuable which in turn makes the return of counterfeiting higher.
The third row in Figure 2 illustrates the e⁄ects of a change in buyers￿market power. Since
buyers holding genuine money get no surplus when sellers make o⁄ers, genuine money becomes
more valuable as buyers get more opportunities to determine the terms of trade. An increase in
￿ has two opposite e⁄ects on agents￿incentives to produce counterfeits. Genuine money becomes
more valuable, and hence, agents have higher incentives to enter the counterfeiting sector. But a
higher ￿ also implies that counterfeits can be traded less frequently because no trade takes place
in uninformed matches when buyers make o⁄ers. The former e⁄ect dominates when ￿ is low.
Finally, the last row in Figure 2 reports the e⁄ects of a change in the supply of genuine money.
If there is a shortage of genuine money then agents have an incentive to produce counterfeits since
24The ￿rst best is achieved when the number of matches is maximum (m = 1=2) and agents trade q
￿ in all matches.
22Figure 2: Counterfeiting equilibria
it is hard to trade as a seller. As the quantity of genuine money becomes su¢ ciently abundant the
opposite occurs and an increase in m discourages counterfeiting. Society￿ s welfare increases with
the quantity of money (over the range where there is counterfeiting in equilibrium).
8 Conclusion
We have studied and extended the model of counterfeiting from Nosal and Wallace (2007). Our
results challenge a key proposition in NW, that the threat of counterfeiting makes the existence
of a monetary equilibrium less likely. We showed that the existence of a monetary equilibrium is
not threatened by the possibility of counterfeiting. However, in contrast with what was previously
thought, the value of genuine money and society￿ s welfare can be directly a⁄ected by the cost of
producing counterfeits and the recognizability of money, even if counterfeiting does not occur in
equilibrium. An important policy implication is that, even though counterfeiting seems insigni￿-
23cant, government e⁄orts such as introducing new design of currency or law enforcement that makes
counterfeiting more costly should be necessary to prevent the threat to have adverse e⁄ects on
output and welfare.25
We also showed that the model can account for the counterfeiting activity, even modest, that
is observed in the U.S. and most countries. We have o⁄ered two extensions of the model under
which the threat of counterfeiting is realized: if counterfeits can circulate across periods, or if sellers
set terms of trade in some matches. Under both versions of the model, policies that improve the
recognizability of the currency raise the value of genuine money and society￿ s welfare. In some
cases, however, those policies are ine⁄ective in terms of reducing the extent of counterfeiting, or
they may even have perverse e⁄ects.
Several other extensions would be worth exploring, such as introducing various punishments
for people caught with counterfeits, or considering a costly technology to detect counterfeits. For
tractability, we have assumed an agent￿ s money holding lies in the set f0;1g. This assumption can
capture the phenomenon of currency shortage and the role of counterfeiting in promoting trades.
Nonetheless, to study the e⁄ects of monetary policy such as in￿ ation on counterfeiting, one may
like to consider a version of the model with no restrictions on individuals￿money holdings. This
can be done by using a quasi-linear model with divisible money (e.g. Lagos and Wright 2005) in
which some agents can choose to produce any quantity of counterfeits at a ￿xed cost.26
25￿We have to stay ahead of technology, which is developing and progressing at an ever-increasing rate. Items
like digital printers and higher quality scanners are becoming more readily available at cheaper prices. So we have
to make our currency notes safer, smarter, and more secure in order to stay ahead of the would-be counterfeiters,￿
by Tom Ferguson, Director of the Treasury￿ s Bureau of Engraving and Printing, which produces U.S. currency. The
quote is taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Summer 2004.
26See Appendix E and Rocheteau (2008) for such a model.
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26Appendix A.
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1.
The strategy of being a producer yields at least ￿0 since a seller always has the option to
reject an o⁄er that is proposed. The strategy of producing counterfeits and o⁄ering (q;p) yields an
expected payo⁄ no greater than ￿k +(1￿m)u(q)+￿0 since the matching probability of the buyer
is bounded above by 1￿m and the buyer enjoys the utility of consuming q if the o⁄er is accepted.
Then, ￿k + (1 ￿ m)u(q) + ￿0 < ￿0; irrespective of the choices of other agents, such as the decision
of agents without money to produce counterfeits or the decision of sellers to accept or reject the
o⁄er (q;p).￿
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2.
According to Re￿nement 1a, any o⁄er (q;p) satisfying ￿k + (1 ￿ m)u(q) < 0 is attributed to a
genuine buyer (￿(q;p) = 1), and the expected surplus of the seller is ￿q + p(￿1 ￿ ￿0). Moreover,
if (5) holds then the o⁄er is accepted. In order to ￿nd the greatest lower bound for the buyer￿ s
surplus, we consider o⁄ers in the closure of the set
f(q;p) 2 R+ ￿ [0;1] : ￿q + p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0 and ￿ k + (1 ￿ m)u(q) < 0g;
which gives (5) and (6).￿
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) There is no equilibrium with n > 0. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose n > 0.
Then, from (3) ￿ = c requires qu
c > 0. For the o⁄er (qu
c;pu





c(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0:
Consider the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er (q0;p0) such that p0 = pu















< ￿1 ￿ ￿0: (43)
We ￿rst establish that the set of o⁄ers (q0;p0) is not empty. Using the fact that ￿(qu
c;pu
c) < 1, the
seller￿ s participation constraint at the proposed equilibrium implies qu
c < pu
















there is a q0 ￿ 0 that satis￿es
(43). Second, we show that any o⁄er (q0;p0) disquali￿es the proposed equilibrium according to





c ￿ ")(￿1 ￿ ￿0). From (43), u(qu
c) ￿ u(q0) > 0 and therefore qu
c ￿ q0 > 0. So (9) is
satis￿ed as well.
(ii) In any equilibrium with n = 0 the o⁄er made by a genuine buyer solves (4)-(6).
Consider an equilibrium with n = 0 where the expected surplus of the genuine buyer is greater
than that implied by (4)-(6). Then, (6) must be violated. But then, from (3), n = 0 implies
￿qu
b +pu
b(￿1 ￿￿0) > 0. With a reasoning similar as in (i), one can ￿nd (q0;p0) that solves (7)-(9) to
disqualify the proposed equilibrium, violating Re￿nement 1b. To see this, take q0 = qu
b ￿ " where
" > 0, and p0 = (qu
b ￿")=(￿1 ￿￿0): Since q0 < qu
b; the o⁄er would not be made by an agent without
money who produces a counterfeit. As " ! 0, the buyer￿ s payo⁄ tends to u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b which is the
total surplus of the match. Since ￿qu
b + pu
b(￿1 ￿ ￿0) > 0 then u(qu
b) ￿ pu
b(￿1 ￿ ￿0) < u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b.
Then, provided that " is small enough, u(q0) ￿ p0(￿1 ￿ ￿0) > u(qu
b) ￿ pu
b(￿1 ￿ ￿0): So the o⁄er is
attributed to a genuine buyer and it is accepted.
A belief system for sellers to sustain the o⁄er given by (4)-(6) as an equilibrium o⁄er is such
that all o⁄ers that satisfy ￿k + (1 ￿ m)u(q) ￿ 0 are attributed to genuine buyers while all other
o⁄ers are attributed to an agent without money who chose to be a counterfeiter. The buyer￿ s o⁄er
is optimal given that sellers believe it is made by the genuine buyers and accept it, and all o⁄ers
that violate (6) are attributed to a counterfeiter and hence are rejected.￿
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
De￿ne ￿(￿1) = (1 ￿ m)fu[qu
b(￿1)] ￿ qu
b(￿1)g. From (10)-(11), ￿(￿1) = (1 ￿ m)[u(￿1) ￿ ￿1]
is strictly concave if both ￿1 < q￿ and u(￿1) < k
1￿m. Moreover, if u(q￿) ￿ k=(1 ￿ m) and
￿1 ￿ q￿ then ￿(￿1) = (1 ￿ m)[u(q￿) ￿ q￿]; if u(q￿) > k=(1 ￿ m) and ￿1 > u￿1(k=1 ￿ m) then








. Hence, the existence of a monetary equilibrium requires
r < ￿0(0) = (1 ￿ m)[u0(0) ￿ 1]. See Figure below.
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A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
From (10) evaluated at ￿￿
1 and (6) held at equality, one can solve for ￿ k: For all k < ￿ k the
constraint (6) binds. Hence, qu
b = u￿1 [k=(1 ￿ m)] and
dqu
b











Since (6) binds, qu
b < min(￿1;q￿) ￿ q￿. Hence, u0(qu
b) > 1 and d￿1
















Using the strict concavity of u(qu








b = u￿1 [k=(1 ￿ m)]; as k ! 0 then qu
b ! 0 and ￿1 ! 0 from (13).￿
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4
From (16)-(18), the lowest value of k above which (18) does not bind is ￿ k = (1￿m)(1￿￿)u(q)
with q = min(q￿;￿￿









@￿ > 0. Moreover, if (18)
binds then qu
b < qi



































29since at the monetary equilibrium the right-hand side of (19) intersects the left-hand side of (19)











A.7. Proof of Lemma 3
We ￿rst show that there cannot be a pooling o⁄er that is accepted such that q > 0. Suppose
there is an equilibrium where both types of buyers o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ p) with ￿ q > 0, i.e., ￿(￿ q; ￿ p) 2 (0;1). The
equilibrium payo⁄s are Su
1 = u(￿ q) ￿ ￿ p!1 and Su
c = u(￿ q) ￿ ￿ p!c. Furthermore, the o⁄er (￿ q; ￿ p) is
accepted if ￿￿ q + ￿ pf￿(￿ q; ￿ p)!1 + [1 ￿ ￿(￿ q; ￿ p)]!cg ￿ 0. Consider the out-of-equilibrium o⁄er (q0;p0)
such that p0 = ￿ p ￿ ", where " 2
￿




, and q0 < ￿ q satis￿es (22)-(23) or, equivalently,
!c <
u(￿ q) ￿ u(q0)
"
< !1: (44)
We ￿rst establish that the set of o⁄ers (q0;p0) is not empty. Using the fact that ￿(￿ q; ￿ p) < 1, the
seller￿ s participation constraint at the proposed equilibrium implies ￿ q < ￿ p!1 and hence
￿




is not empty. Moreover, for any " 2
￿




there is a q0 ￿ 0 that satis￿es (44). To see this,
rewrite (44) as
u(￿ q) ￿ !1" < u(q0) < u(￿ q) ￿ !c":
Since " < ￿ p￿
￿ q
!1 we have "!1 < ￿ p!1 ￿ ￿ q and hence u(￿ q)￿!1" > Su
1 + ￿ q > 0. Second, we show that
any o⁄er (q0;p0) disquali￿es the proposed equilibrium according to Re￿nement 2. From (44), (q0;p0)
satis￿es (22)-(23). Moreover, " < ￿ p ￿ ￿ q=!1 implies ￿ q < (￿ p ￿ ")!1. From (44), u(￿ q) ￿ u(q0) > 0 and
therefore ￿ q ￿ q0 > 0. So (24) is satis￿ed as well.
We next ask whether a pooling o⁄er of q = 0 exists. If q = 0 then Su
1 = Su
c = 0 (since
the equilibrium payo⁄ of a buyer is always non-negative). But Su
c ￿ maxq;p￿1[u(q) ￿ p!c] s.t.
￿q + p!c ￿ 0, which implies that this case is only relevant when !c = 0.
Unless q = 0 the equilibrium of the bargaining game is separating. So the buyer with counterfeit
money cannot do better than proposing his complete information o⁄er. Hence, his o⁄er (qu
c;pu
c)
solves (25). The buyer with genuine money makes the separating o⁄er that maximizes his payo⁄;
any other separating o⁄er violates Re￿nement 2.27 Finally, a belief system consistent with the o⁄ers
27Suppose there is a separating equilibrium where the expected payo⁄ of the buyer with a counterfeit is S
u
c and the
30in (25)-(27) is such that sellers attribute all o⁄ers that violate (27) to buyers with counterfeits, and
all other out-of-equilibrium o⁄ers to buyers with genuine money.￿
A.8. Proof of Lemma 4
From Lemma 3, (qu
b;pu
b) is the solution to (26)-(27). Suppose ￿rst that (27) is not binding.
Then, (qu
b;pu
b) is the complete information o⁄er, i.e., qu

















b > 0 and !1 ￿ !c > 0. But then (27) is violated. A contradiction.





c!c, given by (27) at equality, into the buyer￿ s payo⁄ to get
max
p2[0;1]




b = 0 and u(qu
b) = u(qu
c) ￿ qu
c > 0 (since !c > 0). But then the seller￿ s participation
constraint, ￿qu
b ￿ 0, is violated. A contradiction.
So, (27) and the seller￿ s participation constraint are binding. From the seller￿ s participation
constraint we obtain (28). Substitute pu
b from (28) into (27) at equality to get (29).
In order to establish the existence of a unique solution to (26) and (27), notice that the left-hand
side of (29) is ￿rst increasing and then decreasing in qu
b, and it reaches a maximum greater than
u(q￿) ￿ q￿ ￿ u(qu
c) ￿ qu
c for some qu
b > q￿ solution to u0(qu
b) = !c
!1. So, there might be multiple
solutions (at most two) to (29). However, only the lowest value for qu
b maximizes the payo⁄ of the
























b!1 (this is the payo⁄ of the genuine buyer




c!c in (27) by S
u
c ￿" with " > 0, and denote S
1
" the
associated payo⁄ for the genuine buyer. The set of acceptable and feasible o⁄ers is compact. From the Theorem of
the Maximum, S
1




1. Hence, there is an " > 0 such that S
1
" > S1. The associated














The right-hand side of the equation above is decreasing in qu
b; hence, u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b is maximized at
the lowest value of qu
b that solves (29).




b: The left-hand side of (29) is increasing in qu
b over
[0;qu














b) > 0, and hence pu
c > pu
b.￿
A.9. Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds in three parts by following the recursive structure of the equilibrium. First,
we show that a unique solution n 2 (0;1 ￿ m) to (32) exists provided that
1 ￿ m >






c = min[q￿;￿(1 ￿ ￿)k]. We then derive condition (34) from (45). Second, given
condition (45), we show that there is a unique !1 > !c that solves (33). Third, we establish that
there is no equilibrium with !1 ￿ !c.
(i) The right-hand side of (32) is independent of n while the left-hand side is strictly decreasing
for all n 2 [0;1 ￿ m]. Hence, if a solution exists, it is unique. At n = 1 ￿ m, the left-hand side is
0. So a solution to (32) exists, and it is such that n > 0, if the left-hand side of (32) evaluated at
n = 0 is greater than the right-hand side, which gives (45).




c : If q￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)k then ￿ k =
(1￿m)[u(q￿)￿q￿]
1￿(1￿￿)￿ > 0: For all k < ￿ k; (45) holds, and there exists a counterfeiting equilibrium. Consider






































where we have used that qi
c = min[q￿;￿(1￿￿)k] = ￿(1￿￿)k. Using the strict concavity of u(qi
c)￿qi
c













< 0: Hence, the






[u0(0)￿1](1￿￿)￿ (from L￿ Hopital￿ s
rule). Then, (45) becomes (1 ￿ m)[u0(0) ￿ 1] >
[1￿(1￿￿)￿]
(1￿￿)￿ = r0; which gives (34).
(ii) Take as given the solution n 2 (0;1 ￿ m) to (32). We start by establishing that a solution






with a strict inequality when !1 > !c. (To see this, recall from Lemma 4 that the incentive-
compatibility condition (27) is binding.) At !1 = !c, qu
b = qu
c = qi
c (from (29)) and the right-hand
side of (33) is






= [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿]k > (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)k = r!c;
where we have used (32) to obtain the ￿rst equality, the assumption ￿ > 0 to get the inequality,
and !c = ￿(1￿￿)k to obtain the last equality. Consider next !1 = ~ !1 > !c where ~ !1 is the unique







b = min[q￿; ~ !1]. In order to establish that ~ !1 > !c;





!c = (1 ￿ m ￿ n)[u(qc) ￿ qc] where qc = min[q￿;!c]. Since
￿ > 0 the result is immediate. Then,

















By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a !1 2 (!c; ~ !1) that solves (33).
In order to establish uniqueness, rewrite (33) as






= (1 ￿ m ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)[u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b]:
The left-hand side (LHS) is convex in !1 (since u(qi
b) ￿ qi
b is concave), it is equal to 0 at !1 = 0, it
reaches a negative minimum at !1 = ￿ q where ￿ q solves
u0(￿ q) = 1 +
r
(1 ￿ m ￿ n)￿
;
and it is equal to r!1 ￿ (1 ￿ m ￿ n)￿ [u(q￿) ￿ q￿] for all !1 ￿ q￿. Hence, LHS is increasing for all
!1 > ￿ q and it becomes positive for su¢ ciently large !1. The right-hand side is decreasing in !1.













for all !1 > !c. (Recall from Lemma 4 that qu
b < qu
c ￿ q￿ so that the denominator of the previous
expression is positive.) Consequently, the solution !1 2 (!c; ~ !1) to (33) is unique.
(iii) Suppose there is an equilibrium with !1 ￿ !c. Following a similar reasoning as in the text,
!1 and !c solve






















where, from Lemma 4, qu














































A contradiction whenever ￿ > 0.￿
A.10. Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Change in m. The right-hand side of (32) is independent of n and m. Hence, (32)
determines a unique fraction of buyers, n+m. Consequently, @(n+m)=@m = 0 and @n=@m = ￿1.
Since
@(n+m)
@m = 0 then, from (33), @!1
@m = 0.
(ii) Change in k. If q￿ ￿ ￿(1￿￿)k then qi
c = q￿ is independent of k and hence the right-hand








< 0: The right-hand side of (32) is thus increasing in k. Hence, @n
@k < 0.













@!1 is evaluated at the equilibrium. From the proof of Proposition 5, and the fact that
there exists a unique !1 > 0 solution to (33), r ￿ @RHS
@!1 > 0 and @!1
@k > 0.

















where RHS is the right-hand side of (33) and @RHS
@!1 is evaluated at the equilibrium.
(vi) Change in ￿. The numerator on the right-hand side of (32) is increasing in ￿ while the
denominator is decreasing in ￿; since qi
c = ￿(1￿￿)k. Hence, @n
@￿ < 0. Following a similar reasoning
as in (ii), @!1
@￿ > 0.￿
A.11. Proof of Proposition 7
(i) From Proposition 6 (i) and (35),
dW
dm
= ￿￿1 (!1 ￿ !c) > 0:
(ii) From Proposition 6 (iii), @n
@￿ = 0 and @!1
@￿ > 0: Hence, W increases with ￿.￿
A.12. Proof of Proposition 8
The conditions are derived directly from (45) and the proof of Proposition 5 by taking ￿ ! 0:
Next we show !1 ! !c as ￿ ! 0: We have shown !1 ￿ !c when ￿ > 0 in the proof of Proposition
5. Hence, it su¢ ces to show that the inequality is not strict when ￿ ! 0: Suppose not; !1 > !c as
￿ ! 0: Then !c and !1 solve


















respectively, as ￿ ! 0: Then, qi





























35a contradiction. Hence, !1 ! !c as ￿ ! 0.￿
A.13. Proof of Lemma 5
Consider the problem of the seller if we do not impose the contracts o⁄ered by the seller to be
ex-post individually rational. Suppose that the seller chooses a menu of contracts f(qg;pg);(qc;pc)g,
where (qg;pg) is the contract intended for genuine buyers and (qc;pc) is intended for counterfeiters,












s.t. u(qg) ￿ pg!1 ￿ 0; (52)
u(qg) ￿ pg!1 ￿ u(qc) ￿ pc!1; (53)
qc ￿ qg: (54)
According to (51) the expected payo⁄ of the seller is his production cost ￿qc if he trades with a
counterfeiter, and the transfer of genuine money minus his production cost, pg!1 ￿ qg, if he trades
with a genuine buyer. The constraint (52) indicates that the genuine buyer must obtain a positive
surplus, while (53) requires that the genuine buyer prefers the contract that is intended to him. An
incentive-compatibility constraint similar to (53) also holds for the counterfeiters, which reduces
to (54), since counterfeits are not valued across dates. According to (54), a counterfeiter chooses
the contract with the highest output. First, the constraint qc ￿ qg is binding. The proof is by
contradiction. Suppose qc > qg. Then the seller could reduce qc which would increase his payo⁄
(see (51)) and would relax the incentive-compatibility condition (53) for genuine buyers. Second,
given qc = qg the seller can choose pc = pg; as pc does not a⁄ect seller￿ s objective function (51), to









s.t. u(qg) ￿ pg!1 ￿ 0: (56)
This pooling contract is ex-post individually rational since it does not reveal the type of the buyer.
The menus f(qg;pg);(qc;pc)g such that (qg;pg) solves (55)-(56), qc = qg and pc > pg would be payo⁄
36equivalent but would not be ex-post individually rational since a seller would not want to trade
with a buyer choosing the contract (qc;pc).￿
A.14. Proof of Lemma 6
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an equilibrium such that (qu
b;pu
b) 6= (0;0). By
incentive-compatibility, a genuine buyer cannot make an active o⁄er (with positive consumption)




c). By a reasoning similar to the
one in the proof of Proposition 1, Part (i), or in Lemma 3, genuine buyers could make an alternative
o⁄er (q0;p0) such that q0 < qu
c; p0 < pu
c, u(q0) ￿ p0!1 > u(qu
b) ￿ pu
b!1 and p0!1 ￿ q0 ￿ 0. Such an
o⁄er disquali￿es the proposed pooling outcome according to our forward-induction argument. A
belief system that sustains (qu
b;pu
b) = (0;0) as a solution to (1) is ￿(q;p) = 0 for all (q;p) such that
q > 0.￿
37Appendix B. Non-counterfeiting monetary equilibrium under par-
tial con￿scation (￿ < 1)
In Section 6 we focused on equilibria with n > 0. We construct non-counterfeiting monetary
equilibria when (45) does not hold. We adopt a belief system that is in the similar spirit as the one




















According to (57), an o⁄er such that the sum of the expected trade surplus and the discounted value
of a counterfeit is no greater than the cost of producing the counterfeit should not be attributed
to a counterfeiter. All other o⁄ers are attributed to a buyer holding a counterfeit. We show below









+ !c ￿ k: (58)




b) = arg max
q;p￿1
[u(q) ￿ p!1] (59)









+ (1 ￿ ￿)[u(q) ￿ p!c]
￿
+ !c ￿ k (61)
Proof. Suppose an o⁄er (q;p) is made that violates (61). From (58), u(q)￿p!c > u(qi
c)￿qi
c and
hence, from (20), ￿q+p!c < 0. From (57), ￿(q;p) = 0 and hence (q;p) is rejected. If (q;p) satis￿es
(61) then ￿(q;p) = 1. Hence, the seller￿ s acceptance condition, ￿q+pf￿(q;p)!1 + [1 ￿ ￿(q;p)]!cg ￿
0, is equivalent to (60), which completes the proof.
Provided that !1 > !c then (60) binds and ￿0 = 0.28 The Bellman equation for the value of
holding a unit of genuine money is given by (33). The value function of a counterfeiter solves








+ (1 ￿ ￿) max
q;p￿1
[u(q) ￿ p(1 ￿ ￿)￿c]If(q;p)2Aug
￿
; (62)




b and (60) binds. Then, the solution to (59)-(61) is also
the solution to maxp p(!c ￿ !1); which gives p = 0; and q > 0 solves (61) at equality. This solution violates (60).
38where Au is the set of o⁄ers accepted in uninformed matches.
Equilibria where (61) binds. From (61) and (62), (r+￿)￿c = k￿(1￿￿)￿c, and hence ￿c = ￿k.
From (33) at n = 0, the value of genuine money solves
r￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ m)(1 ￿ ￿)[u(qu
b) ￿ qu







We next show that there is a unique positive solution to (63). The right-hand side of (63) is strictly
concave in ￿1 for all ￿1 < q￿ and constant for all ￿1 ￿ q￿ (since qi
b = min(q￿;￿1)). Provided that
(61) does not bind, the left-hand side of (63) is convex in ￿1 (since qu
b = qi
b = min(q￿;￿1)). If (61)
binds then ￿1 > !c.29 Moreover, (qu
b;pu
































￿1 > 0) and the left-hand side of (63) is increasing.30 From the discussion above,
provided that r < (1￿m)[u0(0) ￿ 1], then there is a unique ￿1 > 0 solution to (63). Denote ￿￿
1 the















+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
u(qi￿















b = min(q￿;￿1) and pi￿
b = qi￿
b =￿￿














This is the complement of (45).
















c. From (58) it is in contradiction
with the assumption that (61) binds.
30The left-hand side of (64) is strictly concave, hump-shaped function of q
u
b . Moreover, at q
u









which, from (58), is smaller than the right-hand side of (64). So, in general, there is either 0 or
two values of q
u













(1 ￿ m)(1 ￿ ￿)
+ p(!c ￿ !1):
The payo⁄ of the genuine buyer is maximized for the lowest value of p and hence the lowest value of q (from











￿1 ￿ 0. To show that q
u
b ￿ q







￿=￿1 so as to increase his expected payo⁄ while keeping the payo⁄ of the seller equal to 0. The constraint (61)
would still be satis￿ed since u(q
u











￿1 ￿ 0 holds.




b) and ￿1 = ￿￿
1. The









+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
u(qi￿
b ) ￿ pi￿
b !c
￿￿









c, it is immediate that (58) holds.
40Appendix C. Sellers have some bargaining power (￿ < 1) and all
matches are uninformed (￿ = 0)
We show that if sellers are uninformed in all matches then counterfeiting cannot be sustained in
equilibrium.
Proposition 9 Assume ￿ = 0 and ￿ < 1. Then, n = 0 in any equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose n > 0. By the proof of Lemma 6, the only
possible trade in matches where genuine buyers make the o⁄er is (q;p) = (0;0). But then genuine
money has no value, ￿1 = 0, and n = 0. A contradiction.
The intuition for why counterfeiting cannot occur in equilibrium is as follows. If there were
counterfeiting, then the only possible outcome in matches where buyers make o⁄ers that is consistent
with our re￿nement is no trade, since genuine buyers would always deviate from a pooling o⁄er.
Furthermore, since genuine buyers get no surplus in matches where sellers make o⁄ers ￿at money
cannot be valued.





[u(q) ￿ p(￿1 ￿ ￿0)] (68)
s.t. ￿ q + p(￿1 ￿ ￿0) ￿ 0 (69)
￿k + (1 ￿ m)[￿u(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(qu
s)] ￿ 0: (70)
The belief system is ￿(q;p) = 1 if (70) holds and ￿(q;p) = 0 otherwise. O⁄ers in uninformed
matches that do not generate an expected utility that is large enough to cover the entry cost into
counterfeiting are attributed to genuine buyers. All other o⁄ers are assigned to counterfeiters.
The value functions for a genuine buyer and an agent without money solve the following ￿ ow
Bellman equations:
r￿1 = (1 ￿ m)￿[u(qu
b) ￿ qu
b]; (71)
r￿0 = m(1 ￿ ￿)[u(qu
s) ￿ qu
s]: (72)
















(71) and (72) !1 solves r!1 = ￿(!1). For all !1 ￿ q￿ and such that ￿k+(1￿m)[￿u(!1) + (1 ￿ ￿)!1] ￿
0 then qu
b = !1, qu





￿0(0) ￿ [u0(0) ￿ 1]
n




. Moreover, for all !1 ￿ u(q￿), u(qu
s) ￿ qu
s = u(q￿) ￿ q￿ is
constant and ￿(!1) > 0 is constant as well. So, by continuity of ￿(!1), the existence of a monetary
equilibrium requires r < ￿0(0).
42Appendix D. Accounting for the di⁄erences with NW
According to Problem 1 in NW sellers￿beliefs are such that ￿(q;p) = m
m+n for all (q;p) in uninformed
matches; i.e., an o⁄er is attributed to a genuine buyer with a probability equal to the fraction of
genuine buyers among all buyers. This belief is more restrictive than what is warranted by the
intuitive criterion, and this is why NW cannot uncover all the monetary equilibria. In a non-
counterfeiting equilibrium (n = 0), this belief system becomes ￿(q;p) = 1 for all (q;p). Under this
assumption, the genuine buyer o⁄ers
(qb;pb) = arg max
q;p2[0;1]
[u(q) ￿ p￿1] s.t. ￿ q + p￿1 = 0
in all matches.
NW assume that genuine buyers and counterfeiters make the same o⁄er in uninformed matches
(See de￿nition of C in Eq. (3)). This assumption is not consistent with the assumed belief system.
Instead, under the belief system ￿ ￿ 1 an agent who deviates and produces a counterfeit o⁄ers
(qc;pc) = arg max
q;p2[0;1]
u(q) s.t. ￿ q + p￿1 = 0
in an uninformed match. Then, (qc;pc) 6= (qb;pb) whenever ￿1 > q￿ since in that case (qb;pb) =
(q￿;
q￿
￿1) and (qc;pc) = (￿1;1). The value of genuine money solves
r￿1 = (1 ￿ m)[u(qb) ￿ qb];
where qb = min[q￿;￿1]. There is a ￿1 > 0 solution to the above equation, and it is unique, if and
only if r < (1 ￿ m)[u0(0) ￿ 1]. The condition for n = 0 requires
￿k + (1 ￿ m)u(qc) ￿ 0;
where qc = ￿1. This condition di⁄ers from the one in NW since qc 6= qb when ￿1 > q￿. So the
condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium derived in NW under the belief system ￿ ￿ 1
is incorrect, and the restriction on beliefs is not implied by the Intuitive Criterion.
43Appendix E. A model of counterfeiting with divisible money
We develop a simple model of counterfeiting with divisible money based on a version of Lagos
and Wright (2005). By using a very natural re￿nement for signaling games with endogenous types
developed from In and Wright (2008), we obtain insights similar to the main results in the basic
model of the paper. Moreover, since agents can accumulate money in the model with divisible
money, it allows us to distinguish the ￿xed cost from producing counterfeits and the marginal cost.
We set the marginal cost at zero for simplicity. Also, the model can be used to study how in￿ ation
a⁄ects the threat of counterfeiting.
Environment
Time is discrete, starts at t = 0, and continues forever. Each period has two subperiods, a morning
(AM) followed by an afternoon (PM), where di⁄erent activities take place. There is a continuum of
agents divided into two types, called buyers and sellers, who di⁄er in terms of when they produce
and consume. The labels buyers and sellers indicate agents￿roles in the PM market. There are
two consumption goods, one produced in the AM and the other in the PM. Consumption goods
are perishable.
Agents live for three subperiods. Buyers and sellers from generation t are born at the beginning
of period t, and they die at the end of the AM in period t + 1. (See Figure 3.) Let Bt denote the
set of buyers from generation t, St the set of sellers from generation t, and Jt = Bt [ St.31 The
measures of buyers and sellers are normalized to 1.
Generation t
Generation t+1
Figure 3: Overlapping generations structure
31This overlapping-generations structure facilitates the presentation of the model. For a related environment, see
Zhu (2006) and Zhu and Wallace (2007).
44Buyers produce in the ￿rst AM of their lives while sellers produce in the PM. This heterogeneity
will generate a temporal double-coincidence problem (see Rocheteau and Wright 2005). The utility
of a buyer born at date t is
Ub
t = ￿‘t + u(qt) + ￿xt+1; (74)
where xt is the AM consumption of period t, ‘t is the AM disutility of work, qt is the PM con-
sumption, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor. The utility function u(q) is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable, u(0) = 0, u0(0) = 1, u0(q) > 0, and u00(q) < 0. Buyers can produce the AM-good
according to a linear production technology, yt = ‘t. Buyers￿endowment of labor is unlimited when
young.
The utility of a seller born at date t is
Us
t = ￿c(qt) + ￿xt+1; (75)
where qt is the PM production. The cost function c(q) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, c(0) =
c0(0) = 0, c0(q) > 0, c00(q) ￿ 0 and c(q) = u(q) for some q > 0. Let q￿ denote the solution to
u0(q￿) = c0(q￿).
Fiat money is durable, perfectly divisible, and it can be held in any nonnegative amount. The
quantity of genuine money per buyer in the PM of period t is denoted Mt. It grows at a constant
gross rate, ￿ ￿ Mt+1=Mt, where ￿ > ￿. New money is injected, or withdrawn if ￿ < 1, by lump-sum
transfers Tt = (￿ ￿ 1)Mt￿1, or taxes if ￿ < 1, to the young buyers.
The market structures are as follows. In the AM, there is a competitive market where agents
can trade goods and ￿at money. In the PM, each seller is matched bilaterally with a buyer drawn
at random from the set of all buyers. All trades in the PM are quid pro quo, and matched agents
can transfer any nonnegative quantity of PM-output and any quantity of their asset holdings. In
order to guarantee that there is an essential role for a medium of exchange, we assume there is no
public record of individuals￿trading histories and agents cannot commit to future actions. Terms
of trade in the PM are determined according to a simple bargaining game: The buyer makes an
o⁄er that the seller accepts or rejects. If the o⁄er is accepted then the trade is implemented. At
the end of the PM, agent pairs split apart.
We introduce counterfeiting of currency as follows. Instead of producing AM goods, buyers
45can choose to counterfeit ￿at money. Production and counterfeiting of currency are two mutually
exclusive activities. Given this setup and the overlapping generations structure, a buyer cannot
accumulate both counterfeits and genuine money. There is a ￿xed cost k from engaging in coun-
terfeiting, but the marginal cost from producing a counterfeit is 0. In the AM centralized market,
counterfeits are recognized with probability one and they are automatically con￿scated by the gov-
ernment. In the PM decentralized market a seller is not able to recognize the authenticity of money,
and he does not observe the money holdings of the buyer.32
Equilibrium
In each period the following game is played (see Figure 4). At the beginning of the game, each buyer
chooses to become a genuine buyer (￿ = g) or a counterfeiter (￿ = c). Buyers choose the amount
of real balances (expressed in terms of AM good) to accumulate (z). Then, in the subsequent
subperiod the buyer makes an o⁄er (q;d) to the seller, where q is production/consumption of the
PM good and d ￿ z is the transfer of real balances. The only action of the seller is to accept
(a = Y ) or reject (a = N) an o⁄er. The payo⁄ of the buyer and the seller are



















where If￿=cg is an indicator function that equals one if ￿ = c and where a 2 fY;Ng is the seller￿ s
response. The value of the money received in the PM is discounted at rate ￿, since it can only be
spent in the next AM market, and it is scaled down by the gross in￿ ation rate ￿.
A strategy for a buyer is composed of the choice ￿ 2 fc;gg of whether to counterfeit or not;
the quantity of money z to accumulate as a function of the type ￿; the o⁄er (q;d) to make as a
function of (￿;z). A strategy for the seller is a decision to accept or reject an o⁄er, a 2 fY;Ng, for
each possible o⁄er. In order to choose his action, the seller must form a belief about the buyer￿ s
type following every possible o⁄er.
The following lemma establishes that a buyer who accumulates genuine money will never hold
more than what he intends to spend in the bilateral match.
32As it will be clear later, the assumption that the seller does not observe the money holdings of the buyer is






Yes Yes No No
Figure 4: Original game
Lemma 8 Any strategy such that ￿ = g and d < z is strictly dominated.















The seller￿ s decision to accept or reject an o⁄er is not conditional on the (unobserved) money
holdings of the buyer. If z > d then the buyer can increase his payo⁄ irrespective of the seller￿ s
response by reducing his real balances z (since ￿ > ￿).
We use the previous lemma to restrict the set of strategies for genuine buyers to o⁄ers of the
form (q;z). Since money balances are not observed, we adopt the same restriction for counterfeiters.
For an equilibrium, we need to specify the seller￿ s belief following an o⁄er (q;z). Sequential
equilibrium imposes little discipline on those beliefs, which can lead to a plethora of equilibria.
In order to obtain a tight characterization of the equilibrium, we follow the methodology in In
and Wright (2008).33 We consider the reverse-ordered game where the observed actions are chosen
before the unobserved ones: the buyer makes ￿rst an o⁄er (q;z) and then chooses whether to
33The methodology of In and Wright (2008) is based on the invariance condition of strategic stability from Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986). It states that a solution of a game should also be the solution of any game with the same reduced
normal form.
47produce a counterfeit or to accumulate genuine money. (See Figure 5.) The order of the moves
should not matter since it does not a⁄ect the payo⁄s and it does not convey any information.
The original game and the reverse-ordered game have the same reduced strategic form. In this
reverse-ordered game, a strategy for the buyer is an o⁄er (q;z) and a decision ￿ : R2+ ! fc;gg of
whether to produce counterfeits or accumulate real balances as a function of the o⁄er made at the
beginning of the game. The belief of the seller will have to be consistent with the buyer￿ s strategy





Yes Yes No No
Figure 5: The reverse ordered game
Consider a subgame where the o⁄er (q;z) has been made. Let p 2 [0;1] denote the measure of
sellers who accept the o⁄er (q;z) and ￿ 2 [0;1] the measure of buyers who choose to accumulate
genuine money. The seller￿ s belief that he faces a genuine buyer following an o⁄er (q;z) is denoted
￿(q;z). The consistency of sellers￿beliefs with strategies implies ￿(q;z) = ￿. Given ￿, the decision


























48A Nash equilibrium of the subgame following an o⁄er (q;z) is a pair (p;￿) 2 [0;1]
2 that satis￿es
(76) and (77).
We ￿rst review all the Nash equilibria of the subgame following (q;z). See also Figure 6.
(i) (p;￿) = (1;1). From (76) p = 1 requires ￿c(q) +
￿
￿z ￿ 0. From (77) ￿ = 1 requires k ￿ z.
(ii) (p;￿) = (0;1). From (76) p = 0 requires ￿c(q) +
￿




(iii) (p;￿) = (0;0). From (76) p = 0 if ￿ = 0. From (77) ￿ = 0 if z(1 ￿
￿
￿) ￿ k.





The condition ￿ 2 (0;1) implies c(q) <
￿


















(v) (p;￿) 2 f1g ￿ (0;1). From (77), k = z. From (76) p = 1 if ￿c(q) +
￿
￿￿z ￿ 0.
(vi) (p;￿) 2 f0g ￿ (0;1). From (77), k =
￿￿￿
￿ z. From (76) p = 0 if ￿c(q) +
￿
￿￿z ￿ 0.
(vii) (p;￿) 2 (0;1) ￿ f1g. From (76),
￿














In order to characterize the equilibrium for the whole game, we move backward in the game
tree and we analyze the buyer￿ s choice of which o⁄er to make. The o⁄er made by the buyer solves
(q;z) = argmax
￿
















where [￿(q;z);p(q;z)] is an equilibrium of the subgame following the o⁄er (q;z).
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Figure 6: Equilibria of the subgame following (q;z)
De￿nition 3 An equilibrium is a list h(q;z);￿(q;z);p(q;z)i where, for given (q;z), (￿;p) solves
(76)-(77) and (q;z) solves (78).

















s.t. ￿ c(q) +
￿
￿
z ￿ 0; (80)
z ￿ k: (81)
Proof. Consider an o⁄er such that p(q;z) = 1 and ￿(q;z) = 1, which requires ￿c(q) +
￿
￿z ￿ 0
and k ￿ z. If the inequalities are strict then the Nash equilibrium to the subgame following (q;z).
The supremum to the buyer￿ s payo⁄, U￿, is given by (79)-(81). It is achieved provided that the
equilibrium of the subgame following the solution to (79)-(81) is (p;￿) = (1;1).
The rest of the proof consists in eliminating other potential candidates for the equilibrium o⁄er.







￿(q;z) ￿ 0 < U￿.
50Consider next an o⁄er such that p(q;z) 2 (0;1) and ￿(q;z) 2 (0;1). The Nash equilib-









=￿z is decreasing with z. The supremum for the buyer￿ s payo⁄ among such
equilibria is





















































c(q) is decreasing in q, ￿ U = ￿k +u(q) where c(q) =
￿
￿k. The supremum is not achieved since
it requires (p;￿) = (1;1).
Consider an o⁄er such that p(q;z) = 1 and ￿(q;z) 2 (0;1). Then, the buyer￿ s payo⁄is ￿k+u(q)
with c(q) <
￿
￿k. The supremum of the buyer￿ s payo⁄ among such equilibria is also equal to ￿ U, and
it is not achieved.















￿z = c(q). Consider ￿rst equilibria
with z ￿ k. Then, among all those equilibria, the supremum of the buyer￿ s payo⁄ is given by the






























The supremum is not achieved since p < 1.
As in Nosal and Wallace (2007), there is a unique equilibrium and it involves no counterfeiting.
The re￿nement, however, does not rely on the Intuitive Criterion. Instead, it considers an equivalent
game (with the same reduced normal form) that pins down the sellers￿beliefs for all o⁄ers made
by the buyer.
The program that determines the equilibrium outcome is similar to the one in a model with
divisible money but no counterfeiting (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005) except that it incorporates an
additional constraint, z ￿ k. A buyer does not accumulate more money balances than the ￿xed



































z = k: (85)
In Figure 7 the equilibrium value for q is determined at the intersection of the downward-sloping















Figure 7: Determination of the equilibrium q












where ~ q is the solution to (82). From (82), ~ q > 0





The condition for a monetary equilibrium is independent of the ￿xed cost to produce a counter-
feit, k. The threat of counterfeiting does not make the monetary equilibrium less likely to prevail.





￿. There is ￿ k > 0 such that for all k < ￿ k,
@q
@k > 0 and @z
@k > 0.

















In order to see the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on the threshold ￿ k, assume c(q) = q. Then, ￿ k is decreasing
with ￿. So an increase in in￿ ation makes the threat of counterfeiting less binding. However, the
optimal monetary policy corresponds to the Friedman rule.
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